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ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, Canada has stepped 
out of its comfort zone in hemispheric af-
fairs, to speak and act forcefully, as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland put it, in 
solidarity with “the people of Venezuela and 
their desire to restore democracy and human 
rights in Venezuela.” With its partners of the 
Lima Group, Canada imposed sanctions on 
the Maduro regime, recognized Juan Guaidó 
as interim president, and called for free and fair 
elections as soon as possible. The article identi-
fies possible factors explaining Canada’s policy. 
The main proposition is that the Venezuela 
crisis features an extraordinary combination of 
domestic and international factors that make 
participation to a multilateral and diplomatic 
push for restoration of democracy an ambi-
tious but judicious option for Canada. The 
article also presents the criticism to this policy, 
and discusses the issue of human rights and 
democracy promotion in the broader context 
of Canadian foreign policy. 
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Canadá y la crisis de Venezuela
RESUMEN 
En los últimos años, Canadá ha salido de su 
zona de confort en los asuntos hemisféricos 
para hablar y actuar enérgicamente, como lo 
expresó la ministra de relaciones exteriores, 
Chrystia Freeland, en solidaridad con “el 
pueblo de Venezuela y su deseo de restaurar la 
democracia y los derechos humanos en Vene-
zuela”. Con sus socios del Grupo de Lima, Ca-
nadá impuso sanciones al régimen de Maduro, 
reconoció a Juan Guaidó como presidente 
interino y convocó a elecciones libres y justas 
lo antes posible. El artículo identifica posibles 
factores que explican la política de Canadá. La 
propuesta principal es que la crisis de Venezue-
la presenta una combinación extraordinaria de 
factores nacionales e internacionales que hacen 
que la participación en un impulso multilate-
ral y diplomático para el restablecimiento de 
la democracia sea una opción ambiciosa, pero 
sensata para Canadá. El artículo también pre-
senta las críticas a esta política y analiza el tema 
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de los derechos humanos y la promoción de 
la democracia en el contexto más amplio de la 
política exterior canadiense.
Palabras clave: Canadá, Venezuela, polí-
tica exterior, democracia, derechos humanos.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, Canada has stepped 
out of its comfort zone in hemispheric affairs, to 
speak and act forcefully, as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Chrystia Freeland put it, in solidarity 
with “the people of Venezuela and their desire 
to restore democracy and human rights in Ven-
ezuela” (Government of Canada, 2019a). On 
January 23rd, 2019, Minister Freeland issued 
the statement that “Canada recognizes Juan 
Guaidó, President of the National Assembly, 
as the interim President of Venezuela.” On 
that occasion she called the Nicolás Maduro 
regime “despicable”: not a common adjective 
in Ottawa’s diplomatic dialect (The Canadian 
Press, 2019). On the day of Maduro’s second 
inauguration as president of Venezuela (January 
10), she issued a statement that summarizes the 
Canadian government’s position on Venezuela:
Today, Nicolás Maduro’s regime loses any remai-
ning appearance of legitimacy. Having seized power 
through fraudulent and anti-democratic elections 
held on May 20, 2018, the Maduro regime is now 
fully entrenched as a dictatorship. The suffering of 
Venezuelans will only worsen should he continue to 
illegitimately cling to power. Together with other like-
minded countries in the Lima Group, Canada rejects 
the legitimacy of the new presidential term of Nicolás 
Maduro. We call on him to immediately cede power 
to the democratically-elected National Assembly until 
new elections are held, which must include the par-
ticipation of all political actors and follow the release 
of all political prisoners in Venezuela. (Government 
of Canada, 2019b)
Ottawa imposed targeted sanctions (under the 
Special Economic Measures Act and the new Jus-
tice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act) 
against 70 Maduro regime officials. Canada 
has sanctions and related measures in place 
against nineteen other countries in the world, 
but only against Venezuela in our hemisphere.1
On February 4, 2019, the Government of 
Canada announced close to $55 million in hu-
manitarian aid and development support, plus 
an additional $4 million channelled through 
implementing partners for regional humani-
tarian assistance in the region. This placed 
Canada among the top donors responding to 
address the humanitarian crisis (Government 
of Canada, 2019a). To put this in perspective, 
the total budget for humanitarian assistance by 
Canada in 2016-2017 was $286.03 million, 
including $14.61 million for the “Americas” 
(Government of Canada, 2018a). 
The Canadian government never provided 
detailed explanations as to why it is so distinc-
tively concerned about human rights violations 
in Venezuela. But over and over again, Prime 
Minister Trudeau (and more frequently his min-
1 These countries are: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mali, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
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ister Freeland) have reiterated that Canada needs 
to step up its pressure “in response to attacks on 
Venezuelans’ democratic and human rights by 
the regime of President Nicolás Maduro” (Gov-
ernment of Canada, 2019a).2 One can neverthe-
less identify at least six factors that can help us 
explain Canada’s policy:
First, the economic and humanitarian crisis 
in this country is unprecedented in a time of 
peace. The economy has shrunk by half in the 
past five years, and up to 3.4 million Venezu-
elans have been forced to flee their homes since 
2015. This has created a refugee problem for 
the neighbouring countries, in particular Co-
lombia, a country with which Canada has a free 
trade agreement and close relations (unhcr, 
2019). A country like Venezuela, which hosted 
thousands of refugees during the twentieth cen-
tury, is now experiencing an exodus of up to 5 
million Venezuelans before the end of 2019. 
Second, the unprecedented momentum 
in the international community to actually do 
something about the crisis. Canada has been an 
active member of the Lima Group, formed in 
2017 to put pressure on the Maduro regime.3 
Since then another major coalition of European 
and Latin American countries, the Interna-
tional Contact Group, was created on January 
31, 2019, to achieve essentially the same goal: 
free and fair presidential elections as soon as 
logistically possible.4 On September 26, 2018, 
Canada and its Lima Group partners also re-
ferred Venezuela to the International Criminal 
Court, which Venezuela joined in 2002 (icc, 
n/d). Canada and its allies also used the UN 
Human Rights Council, the Human Rights 
Commission, and the oas Permanent Council 
to leverage its diplomatic pressure. After four 
pointless attempts to negotiate with the Mad-
uro regime, a fairly solid consensus emerged 
stressing the need for Maduro to step down and 
new presidential elections to be held.5
Third, the presence of a credible and elected 
opposition, carried by the largest anti-government 
protests in Latin American history.6 There is no 
doubt that the nomination of Juan Guaidó 
2  Interesting that on this updated website Maduro is still called “President” in March 2019.
3 The Lima Group was established on August 8, 2017, in Lima, Peru, to coordinate participating countries’ efforts 
and apply international pressure on Venezuela. Meetings of the group have been regularly attended by representatives 
from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Saint Lucia
4  The International Contact Group includes the European Union, eight European countries (Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Portugal, Holland, the UK and Sweden) and four Latin American countries (Uruguay, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica and Ecuador).
5 The four attempts at negotiation with Maduro were: the Mesa de Negociación y Acuerdos (2002-2005), the Con-
ferencia Nacional por La Paz (2014), the Mesa de Diálogo Nacional (2016-2017), and the Mesa de Diálogo in the Do-
minican Republic (2017-2018). See Pareja, 2018.
6 Venezuela is one of the most violent countries in the world and it is not easy to find reliable information on death 
and casualties resulting from repression of those protests, but since early 2014 many hundreds of protesters were killed 
by the regime. According to Amnesty International, 41 people died during public protests from gunshot wounds just 
in a few days (between Jan. 21 and 25) in early 2019. See The Canadian Press, 2019.
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as interim president on January 10, 2019, 
emboldened not just Canada but an increas-
ing number of likeminded countries from 
around the world to step up their pressure on 
Maduro. While there are debates about the 
constitutionality of his nomination by the 
National Assembly (based on articles 233, 
333, and 350 of the Bolivarian Constitution 
adopted under Hugo Chávez in 1999), there is 
no doubt that the legislature became the only 
popularly elected branch of government after 
January 9, 2019. Guaidó’s appointment as in-
terim president offered a constitutional path to 
regime change that represented a “Venezuelan 
solution” to the crisis. 
Fourth, Venezuela is a Western country with 
a solid democratic tradition, unlike countries 
of the Middle East for instance, which were 
similarly (and unsuccessfully) pressured to de-
mocratize in recent history. The goal of Canada 
and its like-minded partners is to “restore con-
stitutional democracy”, not to export it.
Fifth, Canada’s bold response aligns with 
its preference as a “middle power” for diplomatic 
and multilateral solutions to international crises. 
Canada and its partners in the Lima Group 
explicitly and consistently support peaceful 
transition and reject military interventions.7 
Countries siding with Canada are democracies-
-though Honduras and Guatemala, in name 
only--and Maduro’s main allies are not (Russia, 
China, Cuba).
Sixth, Canada’s policy toward Venezuela 
does not depart from an unspoken rule of our 
foreign policy according to which the promo-
tion of human rights and democratic values are 
more easily deployed in countries or regions where 
hard Canadian interests are not at stake. 
While various combinations of these fac-
tors can be found elsewhere, perhaps nowhere 
else do we find all of them in place and rein-
forcing each other.
A STRONG VOICE FOR DEMOCRACY 
IN THE WORLD, SOMETIMES   
Canada ratified all the major international 
human rights treaties.8 The Human Rights 
and Democratic Values agenda (HRD) has 
been the third pillar of Canada’s foreign policy 
since the foreign policy review process of 1993-
95. In fact, it can be argued that it has been 
an integral part of Canadian efforts abroad 
since the early 1980s (Lui, 2012; Nossal et 
al., 2015). Though they are all officially equal 
in importance, the other two pillars (“peace” 
and “prosperity”) are clearly “more equal” than 
the third, to paraphrase Orwell.9 This is not 
7  According to Adam Austen, a spokesman for Ms. Freeland, “We have been clear that the restoration of democracy 
must be driven by Venezuelans themselves; we do not support military intervention to resolve this crisis.” Quoted in 
Dickson, 2019.
8  Indigenous rights may be counted as the exception. See Lightfoot, 2018.
9  Officially, Canada’s priorities in the region under the current Liberal government are as follows: Encourage inclusive 
economic growth and sustainable development; support poverty eradication; promote and defend human rights; stren-
gthen democracy; support climate change mitigation and adaptation; improve regional security; increase opportunities 
for marginalized groups, in particular women, girls and Indigenous people. Government of Canada, 2018b.
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surprising: as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann con-
vincingly argued, in foreign policy anywhere, 
human rights “rarely, if ever, takes precedence 
over other concerns” (Howard-Hassmann, 
2018: 176-77).
Canada periodically “rediscovers” Latin 
America (Daudelin, 2007; Mace and Thérien, 
2012). For all the talk about “our neighbour-
hood” and “our hemisphere”, the reality is that 
Latin America does not matter enormously for 
Canada. The country only joined the Organi-
zation of American States in 1990, though it 
has indeed been quite active in this institution 
since then, becoming a major contributor to 
its election monitoring and assistance, as well 
as human rights promotion activities (Legler, 
2012, p. 592).
Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
once said that the two most important files for 
a Canadian Prime Minister are national unity 
and relations with the US. Not all Canadians 
would agree with that statement, but it is 
undisputable that Canadian foreign policy is 
primarily directed at the US. Even our rela-
tions with other countries are affected by this 
intimate relationship. 
This is not to say that Canada is always 
keen on following the US lead. Canada re-
fused to join US-led military interventions 
in Vietnam and Iraq. What is more, in our 
hemisphere Ottawa has maintained friendly 
diplomatic relations with Communist Cuba 
and never supported the US embargo. But 
Canada-US relations are more vital for us than 
for Americans, and Canada normally takes US 
sensibilities into consideration when conduct-
ing its business with the rest of the world.
In the case of the international campaign 
for regime change in Venezuela, Canada and 
its Latin American allies took the lead in pres-
suring the Maduro government, rather than 
following the US, as critiques of our policy 
sometimes suggest. But the US is certainly 
on board. President Trump famously said 
that “all options are on the table”, meaning 
that a US military intervention in Venezuela 
is not ruled out as an option. It is not clear if 
he said this just because Trump always likes 
the optics of having all options on the table, 
especially the ones that are likely to magnify 
his decision-making power, or because he is 
seriously contemplating this option. At the 
time of writing this article, it remained to be 
seen whether this threat would suffice to incite 
the Venezuelan military to switch sides and 
support interim President Guaidó, and how 
much waiting time is enough to call it a fail-
ure (Toro, 2019). Among the many countries 
involved in pressuring Caracas, the US is the 
only foreign country that does not reject the 
option of a military intervention. One should 
keep in mind that the Venezuelan opposition 
does not seem to oppose a military interven-
tion as a matter of principle.
Canada has free trade agreements with 
seven countries south of the Rio Grande, more 
than with countries of any other regions.10 But 
with the exception of Mexico, these agreements 
10 Canada has Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Mexico. 
Additionally, Canada has nine Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements in the region.
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have not resulted in significantly increased bi-
lateral trade with Canada. They have more to 
do with Canadian investments in the extrac-
tive sector and, to a lesser extent, the financial 
sectors (the latter in the Caribbean mostly), in 
a handful of Latin American and Caribbean 
nations. Looking at total trade by region, Latin 
America comes 4th (C$ 66,346 million), be-
hind the US (C$ 665,397 million), Asia/Ocea-
nia (C$186,182), and Europe (C$119,874) 
(Government of Canada, 2013a).
Venezuela is not a very important trading 
partner for Canada. Petro-Canada left Venezu-
ela after selling its stake to state oil company 
Petroleos de Venezuela SA on June 26, 2007. 
According to the Canadian Trade Commissioner 
Service, total merchandise imports from Venezu-
ela reached C$ 35 million in 2014 (Canadian 
Trade Commissioner, 2018). The data appears to 
be inconsistent from one source to another about 
Canada’s exports to Venezuela, but the relative 
insignificance of the South American country in 
our trade relations is not in doubt.
Table 1
Ranking of countries that imported the most 
Canadian shipments by dollar value (2017)
1. US 
5. Mexico 
16. Brazil
26. Chile
30. Colombia
34. Peru
45. Argentina
$319 billion (76%)*
$6.1 billion (1.4%)*
$1.3 billion
$682 million
$574.8 million
$548.1 million
$343.5 million
52. Ecuador
61. Venezuela
47. Cuba
$240 million
$152.1 million
$313.1 million
* Percentage of total Canadian exports.
(Source: World’s Top Exports. http://www.worldstopex-
ports.com/canadas-top-import-partners/)
This being said, it appears that Canadian oil 
producers have capitalized on Venezuela’s 
economic crisis by increasing their share of 
the world’s largest refining market. According 
to an article published in the Financial Post, 
“Venezuelan heavy oil production competes 
directly with Canadian oil sands barrels for 
space at refineries specially calibrated to pro-
cess heavy blends.” For the first time in 2018 
Canadian exports to the U.S. Gulf Coast outs-
tripped Venezuelan exports. “That’s a fairly 
considerable shift in the balance”, according 
to Scotiabank commodity economist Rory 
Johnston (Morgan, 2018). And yet, it is hard 
imagining this to be a key factor explaining 
Canada’s policy toward Venezuela.
There does not seem to be meaningful 
domestic “demand” from civil society for our 
assertive policy in Venezuela. According to the 
2016 census, there are 674,640 Canadians of 
Latin American origins in the country, out of 
a total population of 37 million, and according 
to available (and conceivably not up to date) 
numbers, only 26,345 of them come from 
Venezuela (Statistics Canada, 2016). Electoral 
politics is hardly an important factor explain-
ing our policy.11
11 Conversely, electoral politics may help explain Canada’s bold policy in Ukraine, since more than one 
million Canadians claim Ukrainian roots.
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Finally, a minor but perhaps relevant fac-
tor is the weakness of the Venezuelan regime’s 
ideological lobby in Canada, compared to the 
Cuban lobby, for instance. For the latter, a 
small but vocal and well-entrenched group of 
academics and consultants (including a former 
ambassador) have been cheering for decades in 
favour of ever closer political and economic 
relations with the island. This has resonance 
in a population with some sympathy for the 
no.1 scourge of Uncle Sam in this hemisphere. 
Unlike some of the countries in the region, 
Venezuela is not a popular destination for 
Canadian tourists. In short, Canadians do not 
have many reasons to be directly concerned 
about Venezuela.
Canada’s strong stand against the Maduro 
regime is routinely presented by government 
officials as evidence of Canada’s consistently 
“strong voice” in support for human rights 
and democratic values (hrd) around the world 
(Government of Canada, 2017). In fact, Can-
ada’s record is spotty at best when it comes to 
pursuing this agenda. As Dominique Clément 
concluded in his history of human rights in 
Canada, foreign policy has been “the weakest 
link in Canada’s rights revolution” (Clément, 
2016, p. 139). And yet, hrd have unquestion-
ably become an objective of Canadian foreign 
policy in the past few decades. Since then, as 
Andrew Lui points out, Canada has played a 
leading role “in facilitating the diffusion of 
national human rights institutions around 
the world.” For instance, he writes, Canada, 
“has been one of the major financial backers of 
human rights commissions in South America, 
most notably the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights.”12
A factor relevant to this case study is the 
perception that our default position on inter-
national conflicts is to offer a helping hand 
as an “honest broker,” that is to say a neutral 
position. This has been to some extent our 
approach to conflicts in the Middle East, in 
particular the conflict between Israel and both 
Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbours, ex-
cept under the conservative administration 
of Stephen Harper (2006-2015). This by the 
way is another interesting example of an “ex-
ception” in Canadian foreign policy: Harper’s 
refusal to be “neutral” or “balanced” in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, a view that somewhat 
departed from the policy of his predecessor 
(or his successor Justin Trudeau) (Chapnick, 
2016, p. 107). Of course, all other administra-
tions have recognized Israel’s right to exist and 
to defend itself against terrorism, so the differ-
ence is subtler than it may look at first glance. 
Similarly, the Trudeau-Freeland stance against 
the Maduro regime appears more forceful than 
Harper’s only if one forgets that the situation in 
Venezuela has deteriorated significantly since 
the election of Trudeau’s liberal government 
in October 2015. Canada may well be an easy 
case study for structural realists in international 
relations, since we rarely observe huge shifts in 
foreign policy as Liberals and Conservatives 
alternate in power.
Evidently, a policy of “honest broker” 
or “bridge builder” can be problematic when 
12 Lui, 139.
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the time comes to muster the moral clarity 
necessary to defend a meaningful hrd agen-
da. Canada was not neutral during the first 
or second world war, and our foreign policy 
generally aligned with the West, the US and 
nato. In this hemisphere Canada, under the 
Liberals, participated in a multilateral push 
to oust Peruvian strongman Alberto Fujimori 
in 2000. It also condemned the coup d’état in 
Honduras in 2009, though it was criticized for 
normalizing the relations too soon afterward. 
In sum, there are precedents for Canada both 
remaining neutral and for taking sides.
REGIONAL INCONSISTENCY: 
“OUR ALLY” CUBA
To get some more perspective, one could 
quickly look at Canada’s policy toward the 
only country in the region that is arguably a 
worse offender of democratic rights than Ve-
nezuela: Cuba. If “Canada will not stand by 
silently as the Government of Venezuela robs 
its people of their fundamental democratic 
rights,” as Minister Freeland said, its policy 
toward Cuba has studiously been to stand 
by silently as the Castro brothers (and now 
President Miguel Díaz-Canel) rob the Cuban 
people of their fundamental democratic rights 
(Grenier, 2018). 
In response to a question during a town 
hall meeting at Brock University on January 
15, 2019, on why Canada has a friendly rela-
tionship with Cuba but not with Venezuela, 
PM Trudeau said: “I think our perspective on 
Cuba has always been one of those proof points 
that Canada makes its own foreign policy 
determination,” and “rightly so” in the case 
of Cuba, even if “successive American admin-
istrations were not particularly pleased with 
Canada’s perspective.” But on Venezuela, the 
tone changed abruptly. He called Maduro an 
“illegitimate dictator” and a “brutal dictator”, 
and added that “anyone who contends to be a 
friend of Venezuela, whether it’s Cuba, Cana-
da, or an individual, anyone who contends to 
be friend with the Venezuelan people, should 
be very clear and standing up and condemning 
the Maduro government” (Kalvapalie, 2019). 
Perhaps we can find here a hint of criticism of 
Cuba, but nothing explicit was ever said by his 
government about Cuba’s support for Maduro. 
All in all, it is hard to escape the conclu-
sion that Canada is excoriating Venezuela for 
trying to emulate a country Canada is proud 
to have sunny relations with.
While the situation may be worse in 
some respects in Venezuela, the difference in 
criticism can be in no way because of Cuba’s 
superior “democratic behaviour.” The kind 
of presidential elections held in 2018 in Ven-
ezuela, while clearly unfree and unfair, would 
represent a positive step toward pluralism in 
Cuba’s one-party system. Arbitrary detentions, 
total control of all branches of government 
by the executive, and violation of democratic 
rights are systematic and written into law on 
the island. While Maduro is accused of violat-
ing the constitution of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, his Cubans counterparts do not 
need to disregard their 1976 constitution to 
trample democratic rights: its template is the 
ussr’s constitution of 1936 (Rojas et al., 2017). 
Cubans visiting Venezuela are pleasantly sur-
prised at how relatively free the media and 
internet access are compared to the reality at 
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home. Monitoring organizations such as The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Reporters with-
out Borders and Freedom House rank Cuba 
lower than Venezuela in their indexes of de-
mocracy, press freedom, and civil and political 
rights. Finally, one cannot imagine the Cuban 
government tolerating public demonstrations 
by the opposition, let alone having opponents 
meeting regularly in a government building, 
and appointing an interim president, who 
could then leave and return to the country. 
True, violent repression in Cuba is not 
as overt as it has been recently in the patria of 
Bolivar. Arguably, this is because Cuba is a 
more stable dictatorship, one that has already 
exported most of its opposition overseas. To re-
call: in the wake of the 1959 revolution, violent 
clashes with the “counter-revolutionary” op-
position lingered on until mid-1965 in Cuba.
This being said, the humanitarian situa-
tion is conceivably worse in Venezuela, primar-
ily because of rapidly deteriorating access to 
food and medicine. But then again, it is hard 
to measure and compare. The Cuban govern-
ment does not produce statistics on poverty 
on the island. We know most Cubans are 
very poor, especially if they don’t have access 
to remittances regularly sent by their family in 
exile, a source of income not (yet) available to 
most Venezuelans.
One can think of several plausible expla-
nations for this inconsistency, starting with 
the Trudeau family and its strange fascination 
with Fidel. Comparisons with US President 
Donald Trump’s man crush on Vladimir Putin 
come to mind. One cannot help but wonder if 
Minister Freeland’s silence on Cuba (it would 
be a shoe-in addition to her Putin-Maduro 
axis of evil) is a concession made to the boss. 
Other explanations, inter alia: Venezuela 
is (still) an oas member, unlike Cuba, though 
if memory serves, Canada and other principled 
guardians of the oas Democratic Charter are 
invariably sanguine about welcoming Cuba 
back to the hemispheric fold. Perhaps hostility 
toward communist Cuba is now perceived as 
an outmoded residue of the Cold War. Venezu-
ela is a post-Cold War failing state, driven to 
the ground by a clumsy heir of Hugo Chávez, 
with no Bay of Pigs or even embargo (the US 
purchases most of Venezuela’s oil) as conve-
nient excuses. Venezuela is in the midst of a 
crisis, with lots of moving parts, rather than 
being fully constituted (or ossified) like Cuba, 
where it is too late for international pressures 
to work. The island fully “slipped into au-
thoritarianism” — just as Freeland described 
Venezuela recently — in 1952 and then into 
totalitarianism in the 1960s. Former US Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s rationale for opening up 
to Cuba was ostensibly that the US tried to 
topple the regime for longer than he had been 
alive, and repeatedly failed. Venezuela is still in 
flux, increasingly isolated in the region and the 
world, and consequently, amenable to change 
under international pressure. Maybe.
Canada’s last ambassador to Caracas, Ben 
Rowswell, testified on Venezuela in front of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 
February 21, 2919. Rowswell’s voice is impor-
tant not only because he represented Canada 
in Venezuela, but also because in his new posi-
tion as Director of the Canadian International 
Center (cic), he has been perhaps the most 
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vocal supporter of the Liberal government 
policy in Venezuela. Asked a question about 
the possible role of Cuba in both the Venezu-
elan crisis and its denouement, Rowswell said 
that he is “not very knowledgeable on Cuba”, 
that he often heard observers saying that Cuba 
and Venezuela’s regimes are closely linked and 
depend on each other for their resilience, but 
that in the absence of popular pressure for 
political change in Cuba, an important condi-
tion for Canadian intervention was not met. 
He even said that Cuba must be “reassured” 
by Canada and possibly the US that it will not 
be next on the regime change agenda (cic, 
2019). This is extraordinary since Canada’s 
justification for its bold policy toward Ven-
ezuela has always been first and foremost that 
the Maduro government is authoritarian and 
therefore illegitimate.
According to the cbc journalist Evan 
Dyer, author of a very good article on how 
the Trudeau government deals with Cuba’s 
influence in Venezuela, Canada has been re-
luctant to call out a government that Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau called an “ally” dur-
ing a 2016 visit to Havana. Foreign Affairs 
Minister Chrystia Freeland went as far as 
characterizing Cuba’s role in Venezuela as “con-
cerning” (Dyer, 2019; Cárdenas, 2018). “The 
issue of the Cuban role in Venezuela was dis-
cussed at the Lima Group meeting in Bogota 
on Monday,” she told cbc News. “We have 
heard directly from the Venezuelan opposition 
that they’re concerned by the role that some 
Cubans are playing in their country.” Dyer 
quotes Global Affairs Canada’s director for the 
Americas, Michael Grant, saying to a Senate 
committee that “Recently, we held our annual 
discussions on a senior level, and I can tell you 
that Venezuela was a topic of those discussions, 
with a view to sharing points of view and trying 
to find a common way forward. Did we? No. 
We have a fundamental disagreement.” cbc 
News asked Freeland if Canada still consid-
ered Cuba an “ally”. Her response conveys the 
government’s malaise: “Cuba is a country with 
which Canada has a longstanding relationship, 
a relationship that includes tourism, and where 
there’s a relationship with many Canadian 
businesses, and Cuba is a country where we 
have a relationship that allows us to raise seri-
ous concerns.” 
Seemingly, Canada is not contemplat-
ing the responsibility of Cuban leaders in the 
13 Corrales and Penfold summarize well the importance of Cuba in the ascendency of Nicolás Maduro to the presi-
dency: “For a start, the presidential succession was carefully orchestrated in Havana, under the guidance of the Castro 
brothers, Latin America’s champions of political survival. Fidel and Raúl Castro were key actors in helping Chávez 
identify and select a successor, eventually opting for Nicolás Maduro. For Cuba, Maduro was a good candidate for a 
number of reasons. As Venezuela’s foreign minister he showed unconditional loyalty to Havana, to chavismo, and to 
an anti-American foreign policy. Maduro also was committed to continuing sending oil subsidies to Cuba. He was 
also seen as capable of appealing to the most radical factions within chavismo while remaining able to talk to moderate 
forces, just as he had been able to do as foreign minister--for example, toward Colombia. He could be both belligerent 
and conciliatory by turns, depending on the circumstances, and this made Maduro appealing to the Cubans. Further-
more, there were rumors that Maduro was China’s and Russia’s top choice for the succession, a type of endorsement 
that Cuba could not simply ignore” (Corrales and Penfold, 2015, p. 163).
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current crisis in Venezuela. Cuban infiltration 
of Venezuelan state institutions is apparently 
complete, as Cuban “advisers” can be found in 
virtually every single office, ministry or barrack 
of the Venezuelan state.13 The Secretary Gen-
eral of the oas, Luis Almagro, advanced the 
number that 22,000 Cubans had infiltrated 
the Venezuelan regime, especially in security 
services such as the Bolivarian National Intel-
ligence Service (sebin). When Chávez declared 
in 2007 that Cuba and Venezuela were a “single 
nation” with a “one single government”, he was 
not kidding. As Moisés Naím and Francisco 
Toro concluded in well-argued article on the 
current crisis in Venezuela, Chávez’s legacy and 
“Cuba’s influence must be at the centre of any 
attempt to explain it” (Naím and Toro, 2018).
Of course, Canada is not alone in being 
indulgent on Cuba. As Patricio Navia wrote, 
in 2009 the oas resolution on Cuba, “showed 
that Latin American democracies were willing 
to relax the strict adherence to the principle of 
democracy in Latin America.” For him, “Many 
Latin American leaders would be amenable 
to accepting Cuba back in the community of 
nations regardless of whether there is a transi-
tion to democracy on the island. Many Latin 
American leaders regularly visit Cuba and fail 
to advocate for the respect of human rights or 
even meet with opposition civil society groups 
in the island” (Navia, 2019). That inconsis-
tency could in theory become useful if Cuba 
could be pressured by its hemispheric friends to 
pressure Maduro. But to seriously entertain this 
possibility, one needs to discard or ignore how 
important the presence of a pro-Cuba govern-
ment in Venezuela is for Cuba’s own stability.
 
FROM HARPER TO TRUDEAU: 
PLUS ÇA CHANGE 
Major turns in Canadian foreign policy are 
rare, and the foreign policy of Liberals and 
Conservatives (the only two parties that ever 
governed in Canada) do not differ as much as 
each of them want us to believe.14
The Trudeau administration’s pugnacious 
policy toward the Maduro regime followed 
the path of our 22nd Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper (February 6, 2006 to November 4, 
2015), who always had adversarial relations 
with the governments of both Hugo Chávez 
(1999-2013) and Maduro. 
Harper’s preference for free trade and lib-
eral democracy in the Americas immediately 
clashed with Chávez’s “21st century socialism”. 
In July 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
toured Latin America and the Caribbean to an-
nounce his government’s policy of re-engaging 
the hemisphere. “Canada’s vision of the Ameri-
cas” comprised three familiar pillars: security, 
prosperity, and democratic governance. The 
trip included stops in Colombia, Barbados and 
Haiti. However, the highlight was a speech the 
prime minister delivered in Chile, in which he 
presented Canada as a preferable alternative to 
both the “return to the syndrome of economic 
nationalism, political authoritarianism and 
14 As mentioned earlier, in the Americas, our policy toward Cuba appears to be the exception, with Conservative 
government officials now and again voicing negative judgements on Cuba’s communist system, whereas Liberal of-
ficials typically refrain from that, at least in public.
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class warfare,” in a clear allusion to Venezuela, 
and to the laissez faire capitalism of the United 
States (a rare criticism of the US model by the 
conservative PM). “Canada’s very existence 
demonstrates that the choice [between the US 
and Venezuela] is a false one,” he said (Woods, 
2007). Note that he alluded to Venezuela 
rather than Cuba, a worse offender of civil 
and political rights and enemy of capitalism. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that unlike the 
“21st century socialism” of Venezuela, Cuban 
communism has never been a model for the 
region, not even in Venezuela. On the other 
hand, twenty-first century socialism, that is to 
say left-wing populism, seemed to be flourish-
ing earlier in the century, as Hugo Chávez’s 
rhetoric (and economic largesse) seduced 
governments in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salva-
dor, and small countries in the Caribbean. The 
“pink tide” differed from the “red” one of the 
previous century in one important way: it did 
not embrace command economy and one-
party state, and therefore blended better with 
national revolutionary and populist traditions. 
A common feature however was the propen-
sity to confront the US and to court anti-US 
governments in the world, regardless of spe-
cific ideological orientations. Thus, Venezuela 
joined Cuba in developing warm relations with 
countries like Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
and of course North Korea.
A low point in the history of relations be-
tween the two governments was PM Harper’s 
message of condolences to “the Venezuelan 
people” following Hugo Chávez’s death on 
March 5, 2013. The prime minister offered 
his “condolences to the people of Venezuela,” 
and said that he looked forward “to working 
with (Chavez’s) successor and other leaders in 
the region to build a hemisphere that is more 
prosperous, secure, and democratic” (Kilpat-
rick, 2018). As reported by the Globe and Mail 
(Toronto), Harper also said: “At this key junc-
ture, I hope the people of Venezuela can now 
build for themselves a better, brighter future 
based on the principles of freedom, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” 
PM Harper’s message of condolences sounded 
more like an invitation to seize the moment 
to liberalize and democratize Venezuela. It 
was deemed “insensitive and impertinent” by 
Venezuela’s vice-minister for North America, 
Claudia Salerno (Mazereeuw, 2014a).
Over the years Harper made numerous 
comments against “economic nationalism, 
class warfare, and political authoritarianism” 
in the Americas. “There’s nothing out here 
that says that running an authoritarian state 
on petro dollars is not going to get you very 
far in the long term,” Harper said. And yet, 
the Harper government never shut the door 
on dialogue with the government of Venezuela 
about trade, security and good governance. 
For instance, according to the same Globe and 
Mail article, “The day before the news broke 
of Chavez’s departure from a Cuban hospital, 
[Canada’s Minister of Foreign affairs John] 
Baird told The Canadian Press that he wanted 
to hold talks on increasing opportunities for 
Canadian businesses in Venezuela.” Further-
more, “Baird said he had a full business agenda 
planned in Venezuela, but that ‘obviously we 
want to promote democracy, and we want to 
promote political freedoms.’” The minister 
also mentioned his displeasure about Venezu-
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ela’s rapprochement with Iran. Canada closed 
its embassy in Iran in September of 2012, and 
Baird said that “Canada views the Government 
of Iran as the most significant threat to global 
peace and security in the world today.” 
Diplomatic tensions are also illustrated 
by several episodes involving the Canadian 
embassy in Caracas. It has been inordinately 
active for years with funding to strengthen civil 
society in the sensitive areas of human rights, 
public health, and democratic governance 
(Government of Canada, 2018c:10). The De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (former name of Global Affairs Canada) 
launched a democracy promotion centre (the 
Andean Unit for Democratic Governance) in 
October 2009, based in Lima but backing civil 
society organizations in places like Bolivia and 
Venezuela, in addition to helping to establish 
independent ombudsmen in Guatemala and 
Peru (Government of Canada, 2013b).
Under Harper, the Canadian embassy 
started to award human rights prizes essentially 
to opponents of the Maduro regime. Canada’s 
annual Human Rights Award, co-sponsored 
with the Central University of Venezuela, 
was presented for the first time in 2009. Each 
year the recipient has travelled to Canada and 
met with Canadian parliamentarians to share 
experiences (Government of Canada, 2018c).
It goes without saying that this singular 
activism created tensions with Caracas. A fairly 
simple gesture like exchanging ambassadors 
proved to be difficult over the past five years. 
The appointment of Canadian ambassador, 
Ben Rowswell, described in The Hill Times 
(Ottawa) as “a rising star in the Canadian 
foreign service partly for his reputation as an 
early adopter of digital diplomacy,” was an-
nounced on Feb. 28, 2014, but the two coun-
tries accepted each other’s ambassadors only 
in June of 2015 (Shane, 2015a; Shane, 2015b; 
Mazereeuw, 2014b). A working group of the 
leftist ngo Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation, the Americas Policy Group, 
deplored the nomination of Mr. Rowswell 
because of indications that “this specialist in 
the political use of social media was appointed 
to the post to facilitate Canadian communica-
tions with social forces that aim to overturn 
the Venezuelan government” (Gómez et al., 
2014). Mr. Rowswell, who is now President 
and Research Director of the Canadian In-
ternational Council in Ottawa, was ambas-
sador until 2017. The same year Venezuela’s 
Vice-President Delcy Rodriguez declared the 
chargé d’affaires at the Canadian embassy 
Craig Kowalik persona non grata, because of 
his alleged interference in domestic affairs 
(Gordon, 2017). Canada downgraded diplo-
matic ties with Venezuela after the fraudulent 
elections of May 2018 by announcing it would 
not seek to replace Rowswell.
Another early indicator of tensions be-
tween the Harper government and the Mad-
uro regime, The Hill Times also reported that 
in July of 2015, Venezuela’s former foreign 
minister, José Vicente Rangel, accused the 
Canadian embassy of helping about thirty 
agents of an unnamed “important intelli-
gence organization” to enter Venezuela. The 
Canadian government rejected the accusa-
tions as “ridiculous and patently false”. The 
former minister-turned-TV-host made more 
accusations in October that Canada was try-
ing to destabilize the country, which Canada 
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again rejected (Shane, 2015a). Similarly, a 
prominent member of the ruling party and 
President of the National Assembly, Diosdado 
Cabello, alleged in the Spring of 2015 that the 
Canadian embassy had prior knowledge of an 
attempted coup against Maduro, an allegation 
the Canadian embassy characterized as “com-
pletely false” (Shane, 2015b).
Finally, it must be pointed out that in 
addition to the Prime Minister and the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs delivering statements 
on Venezuela, two standing committees of 
parliament (the Sub-Committee on Human 
Rights and International Development and the 
Senate Committee on Human Rights) worked 
on the Venezuela crisis going back years, invit-
ing numerous witnesses from the Venezuelan 
opposition (including the wife of imprisoned 
opposition leader Leopoldo López) to testify 
about the looming political, economic, and 
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela.
CRANKING UP THE PRESSURE 
UNDER TRUDEAU-FREELAND
By the time Justin Trudeau’s Liberals won 
the parliamentary elections on October 19, 
2015, the crisis in Venezuela was well under 
way. What is sometimes described as a “slow 
motion coup” transformed the regime from 
a “competitive authoritarian regime” under 
Chávez to a full-fledged dictatorship under 
his former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicolás 
Maduro (Polga-Hecimovich, 2017: 35).
Politically, the important landmarks are 
as follows. In December of 2015 the Opposi-
tion Democratic Unity (Mesa de la Unidad 
Democrática, or mud) coalition won two-
thirds majority in parliamentary elections. But 
despite winning a legislative majority, and pos-
sibly a supermajority, the mud has been largely 
unable to legislate. In fact, as a report for the 
Latin American Studies Association points out: 
`
[…] through a combination of presidential ve-
toes and favourable rulings from government-stacked 
courts, President Maduro has rendered the National 
Assembly nearly powerless. This has included giving 
the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, 
tsj) the power to approve the budget law in October 
2016 (a prerogative that belongs to the legislature), 
perpetuating Maduro’s recurring state of emergency, 
and even declaring the National Assembly in con-
tempt of court (Polga-Hecimovich, 2017: 35).
The opposition’s response was to organize a 
recall referendum, which is perfectly legal ac-
cording to the Constitution. It was nullified by 
President Maduro in October of 2016. 
Arguably, the complete rupture of the con-
stitutional order came in March of 2017, when 
the government-controlled judiciary basically 
stripped the National Assembly of all its power, 
opening the door to the pseudo-elections of a 
new Constituent Assembly controlled by the 
executive in July of 2017. The action against 
the National Assembly led the oas Permanent 
Council to adopt on a resolution on April 3rd, 
co-sponsored by Canada and others, determin-
ing that there had been “an alteration of the 
constitutional order” in Venezuela. 
The presidential elections of May 2018, 
boycotted by most of the opposition, was the 
last nail in the coffin of Venezuelan democracy. 
Most of the opposition leaders were banned 
from participating, because they were in jail 
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or in exile. Meanwhile Maduro continued to 
integrate military generals into national lead-
ership roles (a trend started under Chávez), 
escalated the imprisonment of political dis-
sidents and the repression of popular protests 
that kept coming back in large numbers since 
February of 2014.
Economically, the turning point appeared 
to be a sharp fall in international oil prices, fall-
ing from $147 per barrel to $30 per barrel in 
2016. This led to the calamitous shortage of 
basic goods and medicine, as well as frequent 
and lengthy power outages. Of course, as Moi-
sés Naím and Francisco Toro wrote in early 
2018, “Venezuela’s decline began four decades 
ago, not four years ago.” They point out that 
“all of the world’s petrostates suffered a serious 
income shock in 2014 as a result of plummeting 
oil prices. Only Venezuela could not withstand 
the pressure” (Naím and Toro, 2018). 
Under the Liberal government, Canada 
continued to exert pressure on the Maduro 
regime. It supported the appointment of 
prominent Canadian human rights defender, 
former Minister of Justice an Attorney General 
Irwin Cotler, to an oas panel of independent 
international experts that were examining evi-
dence on possible crimes against humanity in 
Venezuela, with a view to bringing these before 
the International Criminal Court should the 
evidence support this course (oas, 2018).
Perhaps the most significant initiative for 
Ottawa was the establishment, with the active 
support of Canada, of the Lima Group on Au-
gust 8, 2017, in Lima, Peru. It is committed 
to closely monitoring events in Venezuela and 
applying pressure on Venezuela’s government 
until the full restoration of democracy in the 
country is achieved. There is no doubt that the 
momentum for the Lima Group was amplified 
by a particularly activist oas committed to 
denouncing the violation of human rights in 
Venezuela, thanks to the leadership of its new 
Secretary General (and former foreign minister 
of the socialist government of José Mujica in 
Uruguay), Luis Almagro. Almagro is an out-
spoken critique of Maduro and (increasingly) 
of Cuba as well. 
The last Declaration of the Lima Group 
(February 25th), with US vice-president Mike 
Pence in the attendance, was to “reaffirm the 
right of all Venezuelans to live in democracy 
and freedom, and therefore reiterate their sup-
port for the holding of free and fair elections, 
open to the participation of all political forces, 
with international accompaniment and obser-
vation, organized by a neutral and legitimately 
constituted electoral authority.” For these new 
democratic elections to be held, the group de-
manded “the immediate departure of Nicolás 
Maduro and the cessation of the usurpation, 
respecting the constitutional authority of the 
National Assembly and the Interim President, 
Juan Guaidó.” The Declaration also reiterated 
the members’ conviction “that the transition to 
democracy must be conducted by Venezuelans 
themselves, peacefully and within the frame-
work of the Constitution and international 
law, supported by political and diplomatic 
means, without the use of force.”
Under the Liberals the Canadian govern-
ment continued to support initiatives in Ven-
ezuela by ngos working more or less explicitly 
with the opposition. According to the Govern-
ment Response to the July 2017 Report of the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
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International Trade on Venezuela, through the 
Peace and Stabilization Operations Program 
(psops), the “Government of Canada has 
been supporting the work of Barcelona-based 
Institute for Integrated Transitions (ifit) in 
Venezuela with $203,000 in funding in the 
2017-18 fiscal year. ifit is a highly respected 
non-governmental organisation dedicated 
to helping fragile and conflict-affected states 
achieve more inclusive and sustainable transi-
tions out of war or authoritarianism” (Gov-
ernment of Canada, 2018c). Furthermore, 
“The Canadian Embassy in Caracas further 
supports domestic efforts to restore democracy 
and resolve the crisis by using cfli funding to 
support democratic coexistence in vulnerable 
communities and building understanding be-
tween civil society and political actors. Much 
of its $150,000 in annual program funds are 
used to create space for human rights defend-
ers with a focus on justice, freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of assembly, as well as the 
right to health and access to food (see above)” 
(Government of Canada, 2018c). Finally, “Yet 
another cfli project is allowing a local ngo to 
build understanding between Venezuelan civil 
society and political actors in what is a highly 
polarized Venezuelan society. It brings civil 
society leaders and political actors together to 
promote the setting up of agendas of under-
standing in five priority areas: (i) governance, 
(ii) democracy, elections and institutions, 
(iii) political economy and development, (iv) 
justice and security; and (v) life conditions of 
Venezuelans”(Government of Canada, 2018c: 
13). The Canadian government is also one of 
the sponsors for a team of researchers who 
investigate corruption in Venezuela, named 
Transparencia Venezuela. A branch of the in-
ternational ngo Transparency International, 
its goal is to “fight corruption and impunity”: 
not the line of research the Maduro regime is 
keen on (Transparencia Venezuela, n/d).
CRITICIZING CANADA’S POLICY    
In parliament, the government’s policy is basi-
cally supported by the official opposition (the 
Conservative Party), and it was not virulently 
opposed by the social-democratic ndp either, 
until an internal rebellion seemed to have pus-
hed its embattled leader to listen to his leftist 
base and refrain from supporting Guaidó.15 
Outside of parliament, some critical voic-
es have been heard, namely from unions, like 
Canadian Union of Public Employees and the 
Canadian Labour Congress; and from some 
ngos, academics, and columnists.16
Though one likes to think that responding 
to a humanitarian crisis of this scale is not or 
should not be an ideological battle between the 
right and the left, the reality is that voices op-
posed to Canada’s policy usually come from the 
left, though not exclusively, while a wider cast 
15 The ndp’s Foreign Affairs critics Hélène Laverdière “told the National Post that she was speaking for the party 
when she said she’s ‘comfortable’ with Canada recognizing a new interim president in Juan Guaido,” but then the 
party leader Jagmeet Singh refused to do the same. In July 2018 Laverdière announced that she will not run for the 
third time in October 2019 (see Zimonic, 2019).
16 A petition is circulating, representing 15 organizations and 167 individuals as of mid-April 2019.
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of ideological characters support this policy. 
Among the voices opposing a diplomatic push 
for “regime change” in Caracas, it is conceivable 
that many would call for nothing less, if Mad-
uro were a right-wing dictator supported by 
the US, and Gaidó, a budding Fidel or Chávez. 
Criticism of the Canadian government’s 
position can be summarized in the following 
six points, in no particular order (e.g. McQuaig, 
2019; Gagnon, 2019; Taylor, 2019; Kirk and 
Kimber, 2019; Avalos and Spronk, 2019).
First, referring to Canada’s participa-
tion in the Lima Group, many consider that 
the coalition is suspicious, because it cannot 
be much better than the least recommend-
able of its members. Canada is indeed siding 
with countries with questionable democratic 
credentials, like Honduras and Guatemala, 
or questionable tout court, like Brazil under 
the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro (though the 
country joined the Lima Group before he was 
elected in a free and fair election in October of 
2018). Many on the left have quickly noticed 
that the Lima Group is composed mostly of 
conservative governments.
Second, siding with the US is almost au-
tomatically condemned by the left, but also 
by many centrists. With Donald Trump in the 
White House, it is even easier to mistrust the 
US and fear its intervention in the region. For 
example, the ndp stated that “Canada should 
not simply follow the U.S.’s foreign policy, 
particularly given its history of self-interested 
interference in the region,” the ndp leader 
Jagmeet Singh said. “The question of who is 
to lead Venezuela should be in the hands of 
Venezuelans” (Ballingall, 2019).
Third, the Canadian government in-
dulges in hypocrisy when making a fuss about 
human rights in Venezuela and not in Hondu-
ras, Guatemala, or Brazil. It also has business as 
usual (mostly) with countries like Saudi Arabia 
and China, among many others offenders of 
human rights.
Fourth, the policy is all show and rheto-
ric, with no plan B, and no intention to apply 
the same principles in our relations with other 
non-democratic countries in the world (a good 
thing since it would be unsustainable). 
Five, Canada should not push for regime 
change in Venezuela; it should be neutral, not 
blame Maduro more than the opposition, and 
favour no more than dialogue between the two.
Finally, six, the interim president Juan 
Guaidó is (too) young, a self-appointed presi-
dent, and a rookie with no base outside of the 
small district that elected him as representative 
in the National Assembly
To my knowledge, the government has 
not responded point by point to all these cri-
tiques, but this much can be said: it does not 
comment on how unsavory some of its allies 
are in the Lima Group; it makes a point of 
reminding everybody that Canada has been 
involved in multilateral effort to democratize 
Venezuela for years, before the US jumped in; 
it repeats that the Venezuela crisis is unique 
and therefore calls for a unique and urgent 
response; it highlights that neutrality or dia-
logue with Maduro are no longer viable op-
tions, since they were attempted several times 
in the past and failed; and finally, it contends 
that Guaidó was elected as president of the 
National Assembly, the only branch of govern-
ment with popular legitimacy, and therefore 
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he is plausibly the only legitimate leader left in 
the country. Supporting Guaidó, for Canada, 
is supporting a made-in-Venezuela solution 
to the crisis: Guaidó is not supposed to act as 
interim president for very long. The Canadian 
government always insists on the urgency of 
the situation in Venezuela, something its op-
ponents are typically very reluctant to do17.
The Canadian government is not the only 
advocate of its own policy. The Canadian me-
dia have been broadly supportive, and so are 
several columnists and academics. The bottom 
line is, foreign policy is almost never a major 
source of concern for Canadians, not even dur-
ing electoral campaigns. To say that our policy 
toward Venezuela is a burning topic around the 
water cooler would be an exaggeration.
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD?  
At the moment of writing this article, Guaidó 
had just returned to Venezuela from Colom-
bia. Since his return to the country, the regime 
has been zeroing in on Guaidó, barring him 
from running for public office (joining oppo-
sition leaders Leopoldo López and Henrique 
Capriles in the penalty box), accusing him 
of sabotaging the electric sector, arresting his 
chief of staff Roberto Marrero, removing his 
parliamentary immunity as president of the 
National Assembly, accusing him of fraud, and 
letting various officials accuse him of treason. 
There are two possible interpretations: either 
the regime is losing patience with Guaidó, 
or the regime is in fact showing a great deal 
of patience: how many dictatorships would 
let an opposition leader freely organize de-
monstrations and speak to foreign media and 
politicians. 
If Maduro steps down sooner rather than 
later, and Venezuela finally restores democ-
racy, it will be counted as a fine victory for the 
Trudeau government, the Lima Group, and 
many other partners in Europe. It may em-
bolden the Liberals to try the same formula 
elsewhere: to be sure, there is no shortage of 
corrupt and autocratic regimes in the world 
to lean on. 
What is more probable is that Canada, 
either under the Liberals or the Conservatives 
(they may well return to power in the Fall 
of 2019), would soon go back to their usual 
prudence in choosing when and where it can 
practice the difficult art of liberal and demo-
cratic interventionism. While there are many 
non-democratic countries in the world, one 
cannot easily find another country where all 
the ripe conditions for multilateral diplomatic 
pressures are present in such a pressing way.
Canada and its allies may also fail. The 
Maduro regime may get a grip and stabilize it-
self somewhat, as Cuba did after the revolution 
or during the very trying “Special Period” after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then what? 
You own it if you break it, as the saying goes, 
but did Canada break anything? Arguably, 
17 The circulating petition mentioned above handles this in two awkward sentences: “We are cognizant that both 
internal and external factors have played a role in generating the current crisis. Internally, none of the contending 
parties are beyond reproach for their deep erosion of political legitimacy in Venezuela”.
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no. In fact, its responsibility to help would 
potentially be greater if democracy is restored. 
If the US intervenes militarily, it will not be 
with Canada’s support. One thing is for sure, 
a defeat in Venezuela would probably dampen 
Canada’s newly found enthusiasm for virtuous 
foreign policy. 
Either way, the promotion and protection 
of human rights will continue to be an integral 
part of Canadian efforts abroad. How big a 
part, it is hard to know.
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